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Quantum cryptography has attracted much attention in recent years. In most existing quantum
cryptographic protocols, players usually need the full quantum power of generating, manipulating
or measuring quantum states. Semiquantum cryptography was proposed to deal with the issue that
some players require only partial quantum power, such as preparing or measuring quantum states
in the classical basis, which simplifies the implementations of quantum cryptography. However, the
efficiency of the existing semiquantum cryptographic protocols was relatively low from a practical
point of view. In this paper, we devise some new semiquantum key distribution (SQKD) protocols
which highly improve the efficiency of the most well-known SQKD protocols [Phys. Rev. Lett. 99,
140501 (2007) & Phys. Rev. A 79, 052312 (2009)]. By letting players select their actions asymmet-
rically, the efficiency of our new protocols can be made asymptotically close to 100%. Besides, one
of our proposed protocols also utilizes the discarded X-SIFT bits in the original SQKD protocol,
which further improves the efficiency of SQKD. We prove that the proposed SQKD protocols are
completely robust against the most general attack.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum physics has greatly enriched our abilities of
computing [1, 2] and communications [3, 4]. As one of
its application, quantum cryptographic [5] has been stud-
ied extensively both in theory and in experiment. Con-
ventionally, a quantum cryptographic protocol, such as
quantum key distribution [3, 4], requires all of the players
equipped with quantum capabilities of preparing, manip-
ulating or measuring qubits. However, it is expensive and
inconvenient for all players equipped with full quantum
capabilities. In 2007, Boyer et al. [6] proposed a novel
idea of quantum key distribution, where one of the player
Alice has full quantum capabilities, while the other player
Bob is classical. The “classical” Bob either measures
the qubits Alice sent in the classical basis (the Z basis)
and resends it in the same state he found, or reflects the
qubits without any change. They called the protocol as
“quantum key distribution with classical Bob” or “semi-
quantum key distribution (SQKD)”. Their first SQKD
protocol [6] used four quantum states, each of which is
randomly prepared in the Z or X basis. The idea was
further extended in [7], where two similar protocols were
presented based on measurement-resend and randomiza-
tion. Lu and Cai [8] presented a SQKD protocol with
classical Alice. In 2009, Zou et al. [9] pointed out that
the original SQKD protocol [6] can be simplified by em-
ploying less than four states and they proposed five differ-
ent SQKD protocols. In 2011, Wang et al. [10] proposed
an efficient SQKD protocol based on entangled states. In
2015, Zou et al. [11] proposed a SQKD protocol in which
the “classical” player does not need the measurement ca-
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pability, and just needs preparing, sending and reordering
qubits. Krawec [12] proposed a mediated SQKD protocol
where two “classical” players can establish a secret key
with the help of a quantum server. In 2017, Boyer et al.
[13] proposed an experimentally feasible SQKD protocol
by using a “controllable mirror.” And this SQKD pro-
tocol is further simplified in [14]. Recently, Krawec [15]
introduced a new SQKD protocol against certain prac-
tical attacks. Zhang et al. [16] proved the security of
the single-state SQKD in [9] from information theory as-
pect. Furthermore, several multiuser SQKD protocols
were put forward [8, 12, 17]. Besides SQKD, other semi-
quantum cryptographic protocols, such as semiquantum
secret sharing [18–21], semiquantum information split-
ting [22], and semiquantum secure direct communication
[23] have also been studied.
Security is first requirement for a quantum crypto-
graphic protocol. For proving the security of a QKD
protocol, an important step is to show that the proto-
col is robust [6]. A QKD protocol is robust if any ad-
versarial attempt to learn some information on the key
inevitably induces some errors. Boyer et al. [6] divided
robustness into three classes: completely robust, partly
robust, and completely nonrobust. Clearly, completely ro-
bust protocols are securer than partly robust protocols;
partly robust protocols could still be secure, but com-
pletely nonrobust protocols are automatically proven in-
secure. Boyer et al. [6, 7] proved that their protocol is
completely robust. Besides, some others SQKD protocols
were showed to be completely robust [9–11, 16, 17, 24].
For practical QKD protocols, another important fac-
tor is efficiency, which can be defined as the proportion
of the final sifted bits (sifted key) to the whole bits gen-
erated by quantum carriers. In the original SQKD pro-
tocol [6], the quantum qubits used are divided into three
sets, i.e. the INFO set for generating the final sifted key,
2the TEST set for confining the error rate on INFO bits
and the CTRL set for bounding Eve’s information; the
INFO set and the TEST set together are called SIFT set.
Note that in most of the existing SQKD protocols, the
qubits efficiency is relatively low. For example, in the
well-known SQKD protocols in [6, 7, 9], the ratio of the
INFO qubits for generating final sifted key is less than
1
8
to the total qubits in most of the protocols, while the
best efficiency is the protocol 4 in [9] which is less than
1
4
. The reason behind the low efficiency of these proto-
cols lies in the fact that the parameters of these protocols
are fixed, i.e. Bob’s choice for selecting his action either
SIFT or CTRL is totally random (with equal probability
1
2
), which is not a good way for improving the efficiency
of a SQKD protocol.
To improve the qubits efficiency, we propose some
novel asymmetric SQKD protocols following the ideas
proposed by Lo et al. [25] for the BB84 QKD protocol.
By asymmetric, we mean that the actions performed by
each player are selected with unequal probabilities. Dif-
ferent from previous SQKD protocols [6, 7, 9], in our
SQKD protocols, Bob chooses his two actions randomly
and independently with Alice’s choice, but not uniformly.
In other words, Bob’s SIFT and CTRL actions are chosen
with substantially different probabilities [25]. Our proto-
cols differ from the measurement-resend SQKD protocol
in Refs. [6, 7] in two ways. Firstly, we use different pa-
rameters to control the numbers of the INFO, TEST and
CTRL bits that used for generating sifted key and de-
tecting eavesdropping. As Alice and Bob are now much
more likely to generate INFO bits, the fraction of dis-
carded data is greatly reduced, thus achieving a signif-
icant gain in efficiency. Secondly, the X-SIFT bits dis-
carded in [6, 7] are now used to generate SIFT bits in
one of our new protocols, which further improves the ef-
ficiency of the protocol.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In
Sect. 2, our improved SQKD protocols are demonstrated.
We first show our SQKD protocol 1 using four differ-
ent qubits, which is an improved version of the original
SQKD protocol. Then, we devise an novel SQKD pro-
tocol utilizing the X-SIFT bits rather than discarding
them. We also present our SQKD protocol 3 using only
|+〉. And the proof of complete robustness of each pro-
tocol is given immediately after the description the pro-
tocol. This paper is further discussed and concluded in
Sect. 3.
II. EFFICIENT ASYMMETRIC SQKD
PROTOCOLS WITHOUT ENTANGLEMENT
A. Protocol 1: Asymmetric SQKD
The following is our SQKD protocol using single-qubits
as information carriers, which is an improved asymmet-
ric version of the original SQKD [6] where a quantum
Alice can generate a secret key with a classical Bob. Our
asymmetric SQKD protocol 1 performs as follows.
(1) Alice generates a random string a ∈ {0, 1}N con-
taining nearly γ1N bits of 0, with
1
2
< γ1 < 1. She
generates and sends |φ〉
1
, |φ〉
2
, · · · , |φ〉
N
to classical Bob,
where |φ〉
i
is selected from {|0〉, |1〉} if ai = 0, or from
{|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉)} if ai = 1.
(2) Bob generates a random string b = {0, 1}N con-
taining nearly γ2N bits of 0, with
1
2
< γ2 < 1. When
the ith qubit comes, he measures it in the Z basis and
resends it in the same state he found (SIFT it) if bi = 0,
or reflects it back without any modification (CTRL it) if
bi = 1.
(3) Alice measures each CTRL qubit in the basis she
sent it.
(4) Alice publishes a and Bob publishes b.
(5) Alice checks the error rate on the CTRL bits. Alice
and Bob abort the protocol if the error rate is higher than
the predefined threshold Pt.
(6) Alice and Bob randomly select ξγ1γ2N measure-
ment results of the SIFT bits to be the TEST bits, where
0 < ξ < 1
2
is the proportion of TEST bits to the SIFT
bits. They check the error rate on the TEST bits. Al-
ice and Bob abort the protocol if the error rate is higher
than Pt.
(7) Alice and Bob set the remaining bits of SIFT bits
as the INFO bits.
(8) Alice and Bob perform classical post-processing
procedures, such as information reconciliation and pri-
vacy amplification, to produce the final key from the
INFO bits, similar to the BB84 QKD protocol [5]
Theorem 1. The SQKD protocol 1 is completely robust.
Proof. Note that our SQKD protocol 1 use the same
method as is used in the original measure-resend SQKD
[7] to detect Eve’s attack. The only difference between
these two protocols lies in the proportion of the CTRL
and TEST bits used for eavesdropping detection. The
proof of complete robustness of the SQKD protocol 1
can be concluded directly from the Theorem 3 in [7].
B. Protocol 2: Asymmetric SQKD using X-SIFT
Note that the X-SIFT bits have been discarded in [6].
In our SQKD protocol 2, we utilizes the X-SIFT bits for
generating TEST or INFO bits. Our SQKD protocol 2
performs as follows.
(1) Alice generates a uniformly random string a ∈
{0, 1}N , where N = (κ + τ + λ)(1 + δ) with (κ + τ)
is the length of the SIFT bits that includes the INFO
bits with length κ and the TEST bits with length τ , and
λ is the length of the CTRL string, while δ > 0 is a fixed
parameter that is the same as the original SQKD pro-
tocol [6]. Alice generates and sends |φ〉
1
, |φ〉
2
, · · · , |φ〉
N
,
where |φ〉
i
is selected from {|0〉, |1〉} if ai = 0, or from
{|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉−|1〉)} if ai = 1. Alice
sends a qubit only after receiving the previous one from
Bob.
3(2) Bob generates a random string b = {0, 1}N con-
taining nearly (κ + τ)(1 + δ) bits of 0. When the ith
qubit comes, he measures it in the Z basis and resends it
in the same state he found (SIFT it) if bi = 0, or reflects
it back without any modification (CTRL it) if bi = 1.
(3) Alice uses an N -qubit register to save all qubits
coming back from Bob.
(4) Bob announces b after Alice receives the last qubit.
(5) Alice measures each CTRL qubit in the basis she
sent it and measures each SIFT qubit in the Z basis.
Then Alice checks the error rate on the CTRL bits. Alice
and Bob abort the protocol if the error rate is higher than
the predefined threshold Pt.
(6) Alice and Bob randomly select τ measurement re-
sults of the SIFT bits to be the TEST bits. They check
the error rate on the TEST bits. Alice and Bob abort
the protocol if the error rate is higher than Pt.
(7) Alice and Bob select the first κ remaining bits of
SIFT bits as the INFO bits.
(8) Alice and Bob perform classical post-processing
procedures, such as information reconciliation and pri-
vacy amplification, to produce the final key from the
INFO bits, similar to the BB84 QKD protocol [5]
Theorem 2. The SQKD protocol 2 is completely robust.
Proof. Note that our SQKD protocol 2 is similar to the
SQKD protocol 2 in Ref. [9] since Alice in both protocols
only sends one-qubit each time. The proof of complete
robustness of the SQKD protocol 2 in [9] (also see [26,
27]) lies on the usage of |+〉 and |0〉, which implies the
complete robustness of our SQKD protocol 2.
C. Protocol 3: Asymmetric SQKD using only |+〉
In Ref. [9], Zou et al. also proposed an interesting
SQKD protocol with only |+〉 qubits. Here, we simply
modify this protocol to an asymmetric one with high ef-
ficiency. Our SQKD protocol 4 is performed as follows.
(1) Alice sets N = (κ+ τ + λ)(1 + δ), with the param-
eters have the same meaning as our Protocol 2. Alice
generates and sends N qubits |+〉
⊗N
. Alice sends a qubit
only after receiving the previous one from Bob.
Steps (2)-(8) are the same as our Protocol 2.
Theorem 3. The SQKD protocol 3 is completely robust.
Proof. The complete robustness of our SQKD protocol
3 can be conclude directly from the proof of complete
robustness of the SQKD protocol 4 in [9] (also see [26,
27]).
III. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A key point of asymmetric SQKD lies in the fact that
the security of SQKD protocols can be guaranteed if we
could set the numbers of the CTRL and TEST bits to
TABLE I: Proportion of bits used in Protocol 1, where γ is
the probability that Alice prepares states in the Z basis and
Bob chooses to SIFT, while ξ is proportion the TEST bits to
the SIFT bits.
Name Proportion Usage
Z-SIFT γ1γ2 INFO & TEST bits
ξγ1γ2 INFO bits
(1− ξ)γ1γ2 TEST bits
X-SIFT (1− γ1)γ2 Discard
Z-CTRL γ1(1− γ2) CTRL bits
X-CTRL (1− γ1)(1− γ2) CTRL bits
TABLE II: Proportion of bits used in Protocol 2 and Protocol
3, where κ is the number of INFO bits, τ is the number of
TEST bits and λ is the number of the CTRL bits.
Name Proportion
CTRL ≈ λ
κ+τ+λ
SIFT ≈ κ+τ
κ+τ+λ
TEST ≈ τ
κ+τ+λ
INFO ≈ κ
κ+τ+λ
reach some certain thresholds, and it unnecessary to keep
a fixed ratio of these test bits with the increase of total
generated classical bits. The proportion of different types
of bits generated in our SQKD protocol 1 is described in
Table I, while our SQKD protocols 2 & 3 are in Table II.
The efficiency of our new protocols can be made asymp-
totically close to 100%, i.e. these SQKD protocols can
be made arbitrarily efficient.
Besides, in the original SQKD protocol [6, 7], nearly
1
4
of all generated bits, the X-SIFT bits, have been dis-
carded. In our SQKD protocol 2, we make these X-SIFT
bits usable for generating SIFT bits. We use three dif-
ferent parameter κ, τ and λ to control the bits ratios
used for the INFO, TEST and CTRL bits. If we let
κ = N
4
, τ = N
4
and λ = N
2
, our protocol 2 is similar to
the measure-resend SQKD protocol in [6, 7] except that
X-SIFT bits has been used, while if we set κ > N
4
, our
protocol 2 becomes even more efficient. Similar results
can also be obtained from the other two protocols.
In summary, we have proposed some improved SQKD
protocols against the most well-known SQKD protocols
in [6, 7, 11] with efficiency of these improved proto-
cols asymptotically close to 100% based on the idea of
asymmetric QKD [25]. Firstly, we introduce asymmet-
ric SQKD protocols with players Alice and Bob perform
their actions in a random but non uniform manner, which
makes most of the qubits be used for generating sifted
key, but the others for generating tested key is suffi-
cient to guarantee the security of the protocol. Secondly,
we show that the X-SIFT qubits discarded in previous
4SQKD protocols can be used for generating sifted key and
tested key. It is clear that the asymmetric method can
also be used directly to other existing SQKD protocols.
We hope this research would be helpful for practical im-
plementations of semiquantum cryptographic protocols.
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